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Abstract:  This article examines the derivative claim regime under Part 11 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 with a view to identifying key problematic areas and thereafter 
providing suggestions for reform. This will be done through three broad areas of focus. 
Firstly, this article focuses on the current provisions in Part 11 and identifies two 
problematic requirements: the need for a prima facie case to be established and the 
requirement for the court to consider an applicant’s good faith. This article argues that 
both of these requirements are unnecessary and should accordingly be removed. Next, 
this article will focus on key omissions from Part 11. In doing so, it will be shown that 
the failure to expressly provide for both multiple derivative claims and a requirement 
for court permission to discontinue or settle a claim is regrettable. As such, both issues 
should be expressly provided for in the statutory framework. Lastly, this article will 
show that the issue of costs currently plays a significant role in deterring potential 
derivative claimants. Accordingly, this article will propose the introduction of a 
mandatory indemnity order and the conferral of discretion on the courts to financially 
reward successful derivative claimants.  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A useful starting point for a conceptual understanding of derivative claims is the 
principle that a company has a legal personality which is separate and distinct from its 
members.1 It follows from this principle that where a wrong has been committed against 
a company, it is the company, not its members, that has the right to pursue a claim 
against the wrongdoers.2 That said, given that it is normally the board of directors that 
decides, as part of their general powers of management, whether the company should 
pursue a claim against the wrongdoers,3 difficulties may arise when the wrongdoers are 
members of the board and are in a position to prevent the company from commencing 
a claim against them in respect of their wrongdoing. This would be the case where the 
wrongdoers constitute a majority of the board or are able to influence the majority of 
the board. Nevertheless, provided that certain necessary preconditions are met, it may 
be possible for a shareholder in such a situation to commence a derivative claim against 
the wrongdoer directors. A derivative claim essentially refers to a claim brought by a 
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1 Salomon v A Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22 (HL) 51.  
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shareholder on behalf of the company. As its name suggests, the right of a shareholder 
to pursue such a claim is derived from the right of the company to claim in respect of 
the wrong that has been committed against it.  
It is perhaps unsurprising from the foregoing discussion that derivative claims 
usually arise when there has been a breach of duty by a director or directors, and the 
company is prevented from commencing an action against the director(s) in respect of 
the breach.4 In this regard, derivative claims, in theory, operate as a key tool of corporate 
governance by providing a platform for the enforcement of directors’ duties, deterring 
directorial wrongdoing, providing an avenue for companies to be compensated for any 
harm caused by directorial wrongdoing, and serving a gap-filling role by clarifying the 
scope of permissible directorial conduct through judicial decisions.5 Nonetheless, an 
underlying tension that is inherent in any derivative claim regime is the need to strike 
the right balance between allowing companies to operate effectively on a day-to-day 
basis without unnecessary interference from shareholders, and the need to protect 
shareholders by providing them with an avenue for redress in appropriate 
circumstances.6  
Given the importance of derivative claims, this article seeks to examine the 
derivative claim regime under Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) with 
a view to identifying key problematic areas and thereafter providing suggestions for 
reform. The scope of this article will involve not only an examination of some of the 
current provisions of Part 11 of the CA 2006, but also an analysis of some key omissions 
from Part 11, as well as important procedural rules which apply to a derivative claim 
commenced under Part 11 (currently set out in the provisions of the Civil Procedure 
Rules (CPR) governing derivative claims rather than in Part 11 itself). Further, given 
that it will not be feasible, due to space constraints, to holistically address all the 
possible concerns with respect to the statutory derivative regime, this article will focus 
on selected issues which are of key importance and accordingly merit greater attention.  
There are several objectives behind the reform proposals set out in this article. 
First, they seek to remove any unnecessary complexity, and to establish a balanced and 
fair procedure for derivative claims. Further, these proposals are also aimed at ensuring 
that the legal framework on derivative claims does not prevent or discourage claimants 
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5 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP 2007) 74. 
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from pursuing meritorious claims while, at the same time, making sure that concerns 
regarding the risk of a proliferation of vexatious and unmeritorious claims are 
addressed.  
The structure of this article is as follows. First, this article will provide an 
introductory overview of the legal framework governing derivative claims. Thereafter, 
this article will examine two key problematic provisions in Part 11 of the CA 2006: the 
requirement for a prima facie case to be established;7 and the need for a court to have 
regard to whether a derivative claimant is acting in good faith.8 Next, this article will 
assess two key issues which are not addressed by Part 11 of the CA 2006, impeding its 
effectiveness. These are ‘multiple derivative claims’ and the requirement to obtain the 
court’s permission to discontinue or settle a derivative claim. Lastly, this article will 
examine the issue of costs as a barrier to commencing derivative claims, an issue which, 
as will be shown, the CA 2006 does not resolve. In adopting the foregoing framework, 
this article argues that the current regime in the CA 2006 on derivative claims is 
unnecessarily complex, incomplete, and is likely to discourage appropriate claims from 
being commenced. This creates a necessity for reforms to the current regime, as 
discussed in further detail below. 
 
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This section of the article will provide a brief overview of the legal framework 
governing derivative claims, so as to provide the necessary background context before 
proceeding with the rest of the article. To do so, the section will first outline the main 
aspects of the derivative claim regime under common law. This will be followed by an 
examination of the key problems with the common law regime. This examination will 
not only help provide an understanding of some of the policy motivations behind the 
introduction of the statutory derivative claim regime, but will also be relevant to the 
discussion on ‘multiple derivative claims’ contained in Part D of this article. Lastly, 
this section will also provide a brief overview of the statutory derivative claim regime 
under the CA 2006. 
1. Derivative Claims at Common Law 
Prior to the introduction of the statutory derivative regime, a derivative claim could 
only be commenced under common law. To do so, a shareholder had to establish a 
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prima facie case that the company was entitled to the relief claimed and that the claim 
fell within one of the ‘exceptions’ to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.9 As explained by 
Jenkins LJ in Edwards v Halliwell,10 there are two aspects to the rule in Foss.11 First, 
the proper plaintiff in an action for a wrong alleged to have been committed against the 
company is prima facie the company itself.12 Second, no individual shareholder is 
allowed to bring an action where the alleged wrong is a matter which can be made 
binding on the company and all its shareholders by a majority of the shareholders.13  
There are, however, four ‘exceptions’ to the rule in Foss under which a 
shareholder can sue. These are where the act complained of (i) was ultra vires; (ii) was 
in violation of a requirement that it could only be validly done or sanctioned by a special 
majority of the members; (iii) was an invasion of the claimant’s personal rights as a 
member; or (iv) amounted to a fraud against the company and the wrongdoers were in 
control of the company.14 The last ‘exception’ is commonly referred to as the ‘fraud on 
the minority’ exception, even though the ‘fraud’ in question would have been 
committed against the company and not the minority shareholders.15 Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, it has been recognised that the first three ‘exceptions’ are not true 
exceptions to the rule in Foss since they are essentially concerned with the direct rights 
of shareholders16 and thus simply instances where the rule in Foss does not apply.17 In 
this regard, only a claim commenced pursuant to the ‘fraud on the minority’ exception 
can accurately be regarded as a derivative action since it is concerned with enforcing 
the company’s rights and obtaining a remedy for the company.18 
2. Problems with the Common Law Regime  
Despite the theoretical possibility of shareholder recourse through a derivative claim 
under common law, there are several serious problems with the common law regime on 
derivative claims which significantly limit the protection that it offers to shareholders. 
In this regard, the Law Commission had, after conducting an extensive inquiry into 
                                                          
9 Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 221-222. 
10 [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA). 
11 ibid 1066. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 1067. 
15 Alan Dignam and John Lowry, Company Law (9th edn, OUP 2016) 186. 
16 Editorial, ‘A Statutory Derivative Action’ (2007) 28 CoLaw 225, 225. 
17 Alan Dignam, Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law (7th edn, OUP 2011) 428. 
18 Editorial (n 16) 225. 
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shareholder remedies, concluded that the rule in Foss and its exceptions are ‘inflexible 
and outmoded’.19   
 The Law Commission identified four key problems with the common law 
regime on derivative claims. First, the rule in Foss cannot be found in any rules of court, 
but only in case law, much of which was decided many years ago.20 As the Law 
Commission pointed out, to obtain a proper understanding of the rule in Foss, one 
would need to examine the various cases spanning over 150 years, thus rendering the 
law in this area ‘virtually inaccessible except to lawyers specialising in the field’.21 
Second, although a derivative claim can only be commenced if the wrongdoers are in 
control of the company, the meaning of ‘control’ is unclear.22 In this regard, the Law 
Commission noted that while ‘control’ is not limited to a situation where the wrongdoer 
holds a majority of the company’s shares, there is limited guidance on the other 
circumstances that would evidence ‘control’.23 Furthermore, even where de facto 
control exists, as may be the case in widely-held companies where a sizeable number 
of shareholders tend to vote with the directors or not vote at all, this would be difficult 
to establish.24 The third problem is that the scope of the derivative claim is too limited 
in that a shareholder is not able to commence a claim in respect of negligence by a 
director unless it could be shown that the director obtained a benefit from their 
negligence.25 Lastly, the Law Commission was concerned that the requirement for a 
derivative claimant to demonstrate a prima facie case on the merits, in order to establish 
their standing to bring the action, could result in a mini-trial at the preliminary stage of 
the claim. This would consequently increase the length and costs of the litigation.26 
3. The Statutory Derivative Claim Regime 
Given the significant shortcomings of the common law regime on derivative claims, it 
is unsurprising that the Law Commission recommended the introduction of a ‘new 
derivative procedure with more modern, flexible and accessible criteria for determining 
whether a shareholder can pursue the action’.27  
                                                          
19 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com CP No 142, 1996) (LC Consultation Paper) 
para 14.1. 
20 ibid para 14.2. 
21 ibid para 4.35. 
22 ibid para 14.2. 
23 ibid para 4.14.  
24 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, ‘Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World for Company 
Management and Shareholders’ [2010] JBL 151, 172. 
25 LC Consultation Paper (n 19) para 14.3. 
26 ibid para 14.4. 
27 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) (LC Report) para 6.15. 
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Under the CA 2006, a derivative claim is defined in section 260(1) as a claim 
‘by a member of a company... in respect of a cause of action vested in the company, 
and seeking relief on behalf of the company’. Further, section 260(3) provides that a 
derivative claim under the CA 2006 ‘may be brought only in respect of a cause of action 
arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach 
of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company’. Thus, in contrast to the position 
under common law, a derivative claim under the CA 2006 can be brought against a 
director on grounds of negligence, regardless of whether the director had benefitted 
personally from the alleged negligence.28 Further, there is no requirement for a 
derivative claimant to demonstrate that the wrongdoers control the company.29 
Under the CA 2006, a member who wishes to bring a derivative claim must 
apply to the court for permission to continue it.30 To obtain such permission, the 
applicant member must satisfy a two-stage procedure. At the first stage, the court must 
be satisfied that there is a ‘prima facie case for giving permission’ to continue the 
derivative claim.31 Where the court is not satisfied that there is a prima facie case, it 
must dismiss the application.32  
 If an applicant succeeds at the first stage, the court is then required at the second 
stage to determine whether it should grant permission to continue the claim. Section 
263(2) sets out a list of circumstances in which permission must be refused, which 
includes the situation where the court is satisfied that ‘a person acting in accordance 
with section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company) would not seek to 
continue the claim’.33 Otherwise, the court has the discretion to allow continuance, but 
in deciding whether to do so must take into account a number of specified 
considerations set out in sections 263(3) and 263(4). These include ‘whether the 
member is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim’,34 and ‘the importance 
that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote the success of the 
company) would attach to continuing it’.35 
 
                                                          
28 Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006, para 491. 
29 ibid. 
30 Companies Act 2006, s 261(1). 
31 ibid s 261(2). 
32 ibid s 261(2)(a). 
33 ibid s 263(2)(a). 
34 ibid s 263(3)(a). 
35 ibid s 263(3)(b). 
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C. PROBLEMATIC PROVISIONS IN THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 ON 
DERIVATIVE CLAIMS 
Having considered some of the factors that led to the introduction of the statutory 
derivative regime and, thereafter, the legal framework on derivative claims contained 
in Part 11 of the CA 2006, this article shall now proceed to examine the statutory 
derivative regime with a view to identifying key problematic areas and thereafter 
providing suggestions for reform. As mentioned earlier, given that it will not be 
possible, due to space constraints, to holistically address all the possible concerns in 
relation to the statutory derivative regime, this article will focus on selected issues 
which, as will be shown later, are of significant importance and accordingly merit 
greater attention. 
This section will focus on examining two key problematic provisions which are 
currently contained in Part 11 of the CA 2006. Specifically, the requirement under 
section 261(2) for the court to be satisfied that there is a ‘prima facie case for giving 
permission’ to continue the derivative claim, and the requirement under section 
263(3)(a) for the court to consider whether the applicant ‘is acting in good faith in 
seeking to continue the claim’. As will be shown, these provisions create much 
uncertainty and may result in unnecessary time and costs being incurred in the 
application process. On this basis, this article argues that they should be removed. 
1. The Requirement for a Prima Facie Case 
As mentioned earlier, at the first of the two-stage procedure for an applicant to obtain 
the permission of the court to continue a derivative claim, the court must be satisfied 
that there is a prima facie case for the giving of such permission.36 The requirement for 
a prima facie case was added late in the legislative process by the House of Lords so as 
to allow the courts to dismiss unmeritorious claims at an early stage without involving 
companies.37 Notwithstanding this, a closer examination will show that the requirement 
for a prima facie case is problematic and of limited usefulness. Therefore, this article 
argues that it should be removed. 
a) Problems with the Requirement for a Prima Facie Case 
The first problem with the requirement for a ‘prima facie case’ in section 261(2) is that 
it creates uncertainty since the meaning of the term is unclear, with the CA 2006 not 
providing any definition or guidance. Further, the cases thus far have not been clear or 
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consistent on what a ‘prima facie case’ requires,38 and this can be seen from the 
observations made in Iesini v Westrip Holdings39 and Stimpson v Southern Private 
Landlords Association40 regarding section 261(2). In Iesini, Lewison J explained that 
‘the prima facie case to which [section 261(2)] refers is a prima facie case ‘for giving 
permission’… [which] necessarily entails a decision that there is a prima facie case 
both that the company has a good cause of action and that the cause of action arises out 
of a directors’ default, breach of duty (etc.)’.41 While Lewison J was of the view that 
the focus in section 261(2) is on whether a company has a good cause of action which 
arises out of a director’s wrongdoing, this appears to be inconsistent with the decision 
in Stimpson in which Mark Pelling QC (sitting as a High Court judge) stated that a court 
is required to consider, among other things, the factors set out in sections 263(3) and 
(4) in determining whether a prima facie case has been established.42 Therefore, it is 
unclear, for example, whether the requirement for a prima facie case will be met where 
a company has a good cause of action which arises out of a director’s breach of duty, 
but the applicant is deemed not to be acting in good faith for the purposes of section 
263(3)(a). In any case, the term ‘prima facie case’ was not defined in either Iesini and 
Stimpson, nor in the other cases dealing with section 261(2), so it remains uncertain as 
to what the first stage specifically requires.  
It is questionable whether it is even possible to provide a satisfactory definition 
of ‘prima facie case’ for the purposes of section 261(2) given the uncertainty that has 
long existed in relation to the use of the term. As Morgan J pointed out in Bhullar v 
Bhullar, it is unclear what a ‘prima facie case’ means notwithstanding that it is often 
used.43 In this regard, Morgan J observed that the uncertainty in relation to the phrase 
had been recognised even in judicial decisions outside of the context of derivative 
claims.44 For example, in Armah v Government of Ghana, Lord Reid noted that the term 
‘prima facie case’ is ‘not self-explanatory’ and hoped that ‘a less ambiguous phrase’ 
would be used in future legislation.45  
                                                          
38 Keay and Loughrey (n 24) 155. 
39 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] All ER 108.   
40 [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch), [2010] BCC 387. 
41 Iesini (n 39) [78]. 
42 Stimpson (n 40) [46]. 
43 [2015] EWHC 1943 (Ch), [2015] All ER 130 [23]. 
44 ibid [23]-[24]. 
45 [1968] AC 192 (HL) 229-230. 
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The second problem with the requirement for a ‘prima facie case’ in section 
261(2) is that this requirement does not appear to be necessary or effective since it is 
unlikely that applications will fail at this stage. As Gibbs points out, following his 
analysis of the cases on section 261(2), the courts have construed the requirement to 
establish a prima facie case very leniently, with the requirement being met in all of the 
cases examined.46 An examination of the possible reasons for this seemingly low 
threshold adopted by the courts indicates that this trend is likely to continue. These 
reasons include judicial reluctance to throw out a remotely plausible case at the first 
stage especially given that the application can still be dismissed at the second stage;47 
the low likelihood that a claim will be so poorly compiled that it cannot even 
demonstrate a plausible case;48 and the fact that the application at the first stage is 
normally based solely on the applicant’s evidence without any independent input or 
rebuttal from the defendant(s) or the company.49 The negative effect of this is two-fold. 
First, there is a risk that the reputation of the defendant director(s) may be adversely 
affected after the court agrees that a prima facie case has been established, 
notwithstanding the seemingly low threshold. Second, and more importantly, this 
results in unnecessary time and costs being incurred in the application process, contrary 
to the desired aim of the Law Commission of having a simpler, efficient, and cost-
effective framework to deal with derivative claims.50 
b) Reform Proposal 
In view of the foregoing problems, this article argues that the requirement at the first 
stage to establish a prima facie case should be removed, with the application for 
permission to continue a derivative claim to be heard in a single stage.  
As a preliminary point, the proposal to remove the requirement in section 261(2) 
for a prima facie case is unlikely to stoke fears of a radical change in the law given that 
the cases show that it is already possible, with the approval of the court, to dispense 
with the two-stage procedure so as to consider the application for permission to 
continue a derivative claim in a single hearing and to bypass the first stage entirely. 
                                                          
46 David Gibbs, ‘Has the Statutory Derivative Claim Fulfilled Its Objectives?’ (2011) 32 CoLaw 41, 43. 
47 Brenda Hannigan and others, Hannigan and Prentice: The Companies Act 2006 (2nd edn, 
LexisNexis 2009) 87. 
48 John Lowry and Arad Reisberg, Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law & Corporate Finance (4th 
edn, Pearson 2012) 260. 
49 Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006, paras 492 and 495; 19C CPR Practice Direction 5; 
Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, ‘The New Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006’ (2008) 
124 LQR 469, 484. 
50 LC Report (n 27) paras 1.09-1.13. 
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This was the case, for example, in Franbar Holdings v Patel, where the claimant did 
not attempt to establish a prima facie case, with counsel for the defendant accepting 
that it was appropriate for the court to deal with the entirety of the application for 
permission to continue in a single hearing,51 and in Mission Capital v Sinclair, where 
the parties agreed to combine the two-stage process, with the issue of a prima facie case 
subsequently not discussed.52  
Further, the cases indicate that there is some judicial support for dispensing with 
the two-stage procedure. For example, Floyd J in Mission Capital described the 
decision of the parties to combine both stages as sensible,53 while Mark Pelling QC 
(sitting as a High Court judge) in Stimpson went even further by overriding the 
defendant’s objections to telescoping the two-stage process into one, considering the 
two-stage process, in which a prima facie case must first be established, to be ‘unduly 
elaborate’ in the circumstances of the case.54 Mark Pelling QC instead approached the 
application by reference to section 263 and the factors contained therein in assessing 
whether the derivative claim should be permitted to proceed.55 
The level of judicial enthusiasm regarding the dispensation of the two-stage 
procedure and bypassing the requirement for a prima facie case must, however, be put 
in perspective since such an approach was criticised by David Donaldson QC (sitting 
as a deputy High Court judge) in Langley Ward v Trevor.56 Specifically, David 
Donaldson QC was of the opinion that the requirement at the first stage for a court to 
be satisfied that there is a prima facie case provides a filter which should not be 
dispensed with.57 As David Donaldson QC explained, this requirement enables the 
court to ‘make a properly informed decision whether it is right to put the company (and 
the potential defendant) to the expense and inconvenience of considering and contesting 
the application’.58 Further, David Donaldson QC suggested that observing the 
requirement for a prima facie case could result in the elimination of a large number of 
claims at the first stage, which would then reduce the time and costs expended by the 
parties and the court.59 This appears to be consistent with the aforementioned legislative 
                                                          
51 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] All ER 14 [24]. 
52 [2008] EWHC 1339 (Ch), [2008] All ER 225 [36]. 
53 ibid. 
54 Stimpson (n 40) [3]. 
55 ibid. 
56 [2011] All ER 78 (Ch) [7]. 
57 ibid [62]. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid [63]. 
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intent of the first stage as a basis for allowing the courts to dismiss unmeritorious claims 
at an early stage without involving companies. 
While the arguments raised by David Donaldson QC against the dispensation 
of the requirement to establish a prima facie case may, at first glance, appear attractive, 
they do not stand up to scrutiny.  
First, it has already been shown earlier that in practice, it would be very rare for 
an application to fail at the first stage especially since the courts appear to have adopted 
a very low threshold in relation to the requirement to establish a prima facie case. 
Therefore, the assumption that the first stage can act as an effective filter against 
unmeritorious claims appears to be misplaced.  
Second, and following from the foregoing, insistence on a strict observation of 
the first stage, notwithstanding its ineffectiveness as a filter, results in unnecessary time 
and costs being incurred in the application process, contrary to the desired aim of the 
Law Commission of having a simpler, efficient, and cost-effective mechanism to deal 
with derivative claims.60 This is especially so given the prevailing uncertainty 
(discussed earlier) as to what the requirement for a prima facie case entails.  
Lastly, a more effective filter, which allows the court to deny unmeritorious and 
frivolous claims from proceeding to a full substantive hearing, already exists in the form 
of the second stage of the application process and the factors which must be considered 
by the court thereunder pursuant to sections 263(3) and 263(4). This is particularly so 
in relation to section 263(2)(a), in which the court must refuse permission to continue 
a derivative claim if a person acting in accordance with the duty to promote the success 
of the company would not continue the claim, and section 263(3)(b), in which the court, 
in considering whether to grant permission to continue a derivative claim, must take 
into account the importance that a person acting in accordance with the duty to promote 
the success of the company would attach to continuing it. It is clear that a director acting 
in accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to 
continue a derivative claim that is frivolous or unmeritorious, so there is no need for 
the same analysis to be repeated in both the first and second stage.  
For the foregoing reasons, the requirement to establish a prima facie case under 
section 261(2) should be removed, with the application for permission to continue a 
derivative claim to be heard in a single stage. This would eliminate the uncertainty, 
                                                          
60 LC Report (n 27) paras 1.09-1.13. 
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time, and costs associated with the problematic first stage of the application process 
and, in turn, encourage more shareholders to bring meritorious cases, but with sufficient 
existing safeguards against frivolous claims.61  
2. The Requirement for a Claimant to be Acting in Good Faith 
Another problematic provision in Part 11 of the CA 2006 is section 263(3)(a) under 
which the court is required to take into account, in deciding whether to grant permission 
to continue a derivative claim, whether the applicant ‘is acting in good faith in seeking 
to continue the claim’. The focus on this provision is especially important since the 
reported cases show that a lack of good faith is frequently alleged.62 In this section, it 
will be shown that section 263(3)(a) is inherently problematic and that its relevance in 
the context of derivative claims is conceptually questionable. On this basis, this article 
argues that section 263(3)(a) should be removed. 
a) The Purpose of Section 263(3)(a) and Its Problems 
At first glance, the requirement in section 263(3)(a), for a court to take into account 
whether the applicant ‘is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim’, appears 
to serve a useful purpose. As noted by Lord Glennie, the good faith requirement was 
designed to prevent derivative claims from being used to further the purposes of the 
claimant rather than of the company.63 This would be the case, for example, when a 
derivative claim is used to further a personal vendetta64 or as a ‘greenmailing’ attempt 
by a shareholder to pressure the company’s management to purchase their shares at a 
premium.65 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the good faith consideration in section 
263(3)(a) is problematic for several reasons.  
First, the requirement in section 263(3)(a) for a court to consider whether an 
applicant is acting in good faith may lead to uncertainty since the CA 2006 does not 
define the term ‘good faith’ or provide any guidance as to what it means. The absence 
of a definition of ‘good faith’ in Part 11 of the CA 2006 was intentional since the Law 
Commission was of the view that the term would be ‘extremely difficult to define’ but 
‘generally readily recognisable’.66 While it is true that the concept of ‘good faith’ is not 
new, the problem is that the term is open-textured and has been given various meanings 
                                                          
61 Gibbs (n 46) 43. 
62 Edwin Mujih, ‘The New Statutory Derivative Claim’ (2012) 33 CoLaw 99, 101. 
63 Alexander Marshall Wishart, Petitioner [2009] CSOH 20, 2009 SLT 376 [33]. 
64 Reisberg (n 5) 115. 
65 Keay and Loughrey (n 24) 168. 
66 LC Report (n 27) para 6.76. 
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in case law.67 Further, it has been correctly pointed out that ‘good faith’ functions as a 
rhetorical device, rather than a substantive standard which offers a structured mode of 
analysis.68 In this regard, the uncertainty that arises as a result of the utilisation of the 
‘good faith’ consideration may not only have the effect of deterring a potential claimant, 
but may also lead to differences of judicial opinion and hence complexity of case law.69 
Second, section 263(3)(a) may have the adverse effect of filtering out 
meritorious claims. Specifically, if the courts refuse to grant permission to continue in 
cases where a claim is motivated by the personal interests of the applicant or the 
applicant’s ill-feelings, it is likely that most derivative claims will be frustrated since it 
is unlikely that any applicant would pursue a derivative claim to sue on behalf of the 
company in the absence of some personal incentive.70 This is especially so in light of 
the significant costs disincentives involved in commencing a derivative claim, 
discussed in Part E of this article. While it is true that the good faith consideration under 
section 263(3)(a) is only one of the factors to be taken into account by a court in 
deciding whether to allow a derivative claim to continue, and is not a mandatory bar, it 
has been correctly pointed out that this factor is likely to carry significant weight since, 
in practice, it is very unlikely that a court would grant permission to continue a claim 
to an applicant that is deemed to be acting in bad faith.71  
It may of course not always be the case that an applicant would be barred from 
pursuing a derivative claim just because they may have a collateral purpose or may 
derive other benefits in doing so. Indeed, in Iesini, Hughes v Weiss,72 and Mission 
Capital the courts were satisfied that the applicants were acting in good faith in 
commencing their derivative claims notwithstanding the allegations of them having a 
collateral purpose in doing so. In Iesini, Lewison J concluded that the ‘dominant 
purpose’ of the claim was to benefit the company, and that it could not be said that ‘but 
for’ the collateral purpose, the claim would not have been brought.73 In Hughes, the 
approach of the court was to identify whether the claim was brought ‘for the purpose 
of’ vindicating the company’s rights or for some other ulterior purpose.74 Lastly, in 
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Mission Capital, it was held that once there was a ‘real purpose’ in bringing the claim, 
the argument that an applicant was not acting in good faith cannot be maintained.75  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the approach adopted by the courts in Iesini, 
Hughes, and Mission Capital, to ensure that section 263(3)(a) does not filter out all 
cases in which the claimant may have a collateral purpose or may derive other benefits 
in bringing the claim, results in additional problems. First, the fact that a differently 
expressed test was used in each of these cases to ascertain whether the claimants were 
acting in good faith in commencing their derivative claim, against allegations that they 
had a collateral purpose for doing so, creates uncertainty as to whether these tests differ 
in substance and, if so, the appropriate test to be adopted in future cases. This in turn, 
creates a real risk of differing judicial opinions on these issues and consequently, 
complexity of case law. Second, regardless of whether the test to be adopted is the 
‘dominant purpose’, ‘but for’, ‘for the purpose of’, or ‘real purpose’, this is likely to 
create significant difficulties for the courts in its application since it can be very 
challenging to clearly identify and distinguish a primary purpose from other secondary 
purposes.76 This is evident from the struggles faced by the courts when dealing with the 
issue of the prohibition against financial assistance and having to determine whether 
financial assistance had been given for the ‘principal purpose’ of the acquisition of 
shares in a company.77  
In any case, the third problem with section 263(3)(a) is that the issue of whether 
an applicant is acting in good faith is arguably irrelevant in the context of a derivative 
claim.78 After all, the right to commence a claim against the wrongdoer(s) belongs to 
the company, and the derivative claim is commenced on its behalf.79 Accordingly, any 
lack of good faith on the part of the derivative claimant should be irrelevant.80 This is 
especially so since the court in such a case is concerned with doing justice to the 
company, and not to the derivative claimant.81 Viewed from another perspective, the 
fact that an applicant may not have acted with full propriety should not, by itself, result 
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in the company being penalised and the wrongdoers escaping liability for their 
misconduct.82 
b) Reform Proposal 
In light of the foregoing problems, the requirement in section 263(3)(a) for a court to 
have regard to whether the applicant is acting in good faith should be removed.  
While it may be argued that the removal of section 263(3)(a) would result in the 
proliferation of oppressive or vexatious claims which are motivated exclusively or 
primarily by the applicant’s self-interest (such as the aforementioned ‘greenmailing’ 
claims commenced by a shareholder to pressure the company’s management to 
purchase their shares at a higher price or claims by a competitor to disrupt the 
company’s operations),83 such an argument is unpersuasive.  
As mentioned earlier, such claims are clearly not in the interest of the company, 
and will accordingly be prevented from continuing through the other factors to be 
considered at the second stage of the application process. This is particularly so in 
relation to section 263(2)(a) and section 263(3)(b) since it is clear that a director acting 
in accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company will not seek to 
continue a derivative claim that is vexatious or oppressive. Accordingly, the good faith 
consideration in section 263(3)(a) is not separately required to prevent such claims. 
Conversely, if a claim is in the interest of the company and the other criteria under 
section 263 are satisfied, it is difficult to see why an application to pursue a derivative 
claim should be barred merely because it also furthers, or is motivated by, the 
applicant’s self-interest.84 For the foregoing reasons, section 263(3)(a) should be 
removed. 
 
D. SUPPLEMENTING THE STATUTORY REGIME ON DERIVATIVE 
CLAIMS 
In this section, this article will examine two key issues that are currently not expressly 
provided for in either Part 11 of the CA 2006 or the relevant rules in the CPR relating 
to derivative claims. Specifically, neither the CA 2006 nor the CPR provides for 
multiple derivative claims, nor for a requirement that derivative claimants obtain the 
permission of the court to discontinue or settle a claim. As will be shown later, the 
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failure to expressly provide for both these issues is problematic and negatively impacts 
on the effective functioning of the derivative claim regime. Accordingly, this article 
argues that both these issues should be expressly provided for.  
1. Multiple Derivative Claims 
As the Law Commission points out, a multiple derivative claim arises when a 
shareholder in a parent company brings a derivative claim on behalf of a subsidiary or 
associated company within a group of companies.85 In this regard, a claim by a 
shareholder of a parent company on behalf of a subsidiary is referred to as a ‘double’ 
derivative claim and, if on behalf of a subsidiary of the aforementioned subsidiary, a 
‘triple’ derivative claim.86 
The importance of multiple derivative claims lies primarily in the fact that their 
availability helps to prevent a situation where a wrong suffered by a subsidiary 
company goes unredressed, and the wrongdoers escape liability, because neither the 
parent company nor the board of directors of the subsidiary will commence an action 
in respect of the wrongdoing.87 This may be the case where the wrongdoers are in 
control of both the subsidiary company that has suffered a wrong as well as its parent 
company, and are thus in a position to prevent a claim from being commenced against 
them in respect of their wrongdoing. In this regard, and as Briggs J pointed out in 
Universal Project Management Services v Fort Gilkicker, ‘once it is recognised that the 
derivative action is merely a procedural device designed to prevent a wrong going 
without a remedy then it is unsurprising to find the court extending locus standi to 
members of the wronged company's holding company, where the holding company is 
itself in the same wrongdoer control’.88 In doing so, the availability of multiple 
derivative claims also provides a valuable means of ensuring that wrongdoers are not 
insulated from liability through the use of additional corporate layers and their control 
of the corporate structure.89   
a) The Companies Act 2006 Does Not Provide for Multiple Derivative Claims 
Notwithstanding the importance of multiple derivative claims, such claims cannot be 
pursued under the CA 2006. This is because section 260(1) requires that proceedings 
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be brought ‘by a member of a company… in respect of a cause of action vested in the 
company, and seeking relief on behalf of the company’.90 This, by definition, 
accordingly excludes multiple derivative claims from the scope of the CA 2006.91 As a 
result, such claims can only be pursued under common law.92  
The fact that the CA 2006 is silent on the issue of multiple derivative claims is 
consistent with the recommendation of the Law Commission that there should not be 
any express provision dealing with multiple derivative claims.93 The Law Commission 
was of the view that it would not be ‘helpful or practicable’ to do so and that situations 
calling for its use would be ‘extremely rare’.94 Interestingly, the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (CLRSG) took a different view, recommending that multiple derivative 
claims be brought within the statutory framework.95 
b) Problems with the Current Legal Framework and a Reform Proposal 
This article agrees with the CLRSG, and takes the position that the CA 2006 should be 
amended to expressly allow multiple derivative claims to be commenced under the CA 
2006. This could be achieved, for example, by adopting the approach set out in section 
236 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, in which standing to commence a 
derivative claim is not limited to a member of the company that has suffered a wrong, 
but includes a member of a related company within the corporate group. The rationale 
for this proposal is that the current legal framework, under which multiple derivative 
claims must be commenced under common law, is unsatisfactory and problematic. 
There are two separate, but overlapping, reasons for this. 
First, requiring multiple derivative claims to be commenced under common law 
would mean that such claims would be subject to the same serious problems that plague 
the common law regime on derivative claims generally. As mentioned earlier, these 
problems include: having to contend with the complicated legal framework and rules 
of the common law relating to derivative claims; the possible difficulties in establishing 
wrongdoer control; and the fact that a claim cannot be commenced in respect of 
negligence by a director unless it can be shown that such negligence conferred a benefit 
on the director. Requiring multiple derivative claims to be commenced under the 
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problematic common law framework is especially questionable in the contemporary 
economic context in which multi-layered corporate group structures are commonly 
used, and may thus result in wrongs suffered by subsidiary companies going 
unredressed and the wrongdoers escaping liability through the use of additional 
corporate layers. 
Second, and following from the foregoing, the exclusion of multiple derivative 
claims from the CA 2006 results in the problem of having a separate derivative regime 
for multiple derivative claims existing in parallel to the statutory regime, which is both 
unnecessary and unhelpful. As Briggs J pointed out in Gilkicker, the conclusion that 
Parliament had put in place a statutory regime for derivative claims by members of a 
wronged company alongside an ‘obscure, complicated and unwieldy’ common law 
regime for derivative claims by others ‘does not commend itself as an exercise in 
commonsense’.96 Further, it has also been argued that the existence of two parallel 
derivative regimes can cause confusion especially since different rules apply to them 
notwithstanding that they both pertain to derivative claims.97 This is contrary to the 
desire of the Law Commission to simplify the law in relation to such claims. 
For the foregoing reasons, the CA 2006 should be amended to expressly allow 
for multiple derivative claims to be commenced under the CA 2006. First, doing so 
would avoid the need to subject such claims to the problematic common law regime on 
derivative claims. Further, the implementation of the proposal would also remove the 
problem of having a parallel derivative regime for multiple derivative claims, along 
with the resulting uncertainty that it creates. Lastly, allowing for multiple derivative 
claims to be commenced under the CA 2006 would also align the UK with other 
common law jurisdictions in which multiple derivative claims are incorporated within 
the statutory framework, such as in Canada,98 Singapore,99 Australia,100 and New 
Zealand.101   
2.  Discontinuance or Settlement of Claims 
The second key issue that is currently not addressed by the CA 2006 or the CPR is a 
requirement for a claimant to obtain the permission of the court to discontinue or settle 
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a derivative claim. This is notwithstanding the recommendation of the Law 
Commission for such a requirement to be expressly provided for.102 In this section, it 
will be argued that the absence of such a requirement is problematic and that the CPR 
should accordingly be amended to expressly provide for this requirement. 
a) The Risk of Collusion 
As the Law Commission correctly pointed out, the absence of a requirement for a 
derivative claimant to obtain the permission of the court to discontinue or settle a 
derivative claim is problematic since it ‘could give rise to serious possibilities of 
collusion, with the [defendant] directors buying off the claimant in disregard of the 
rights of the company and its members’.103 In this regard, there is also a risk that the 
claimant may agree to discontinue or settle the claim against the defendant on terms 
disadvantageous to the company, but which may be beneficial to themselves.104 Such 
terms could include, for example, a purchase of the claimant’s shares at a price 
significantly above their market value105 and the payment of a small amount of financial 
compensation by the defendant to the company which does not adequately reflect the 
harm suffered by the company or is disproportionately low, having regard to the 
expected probability of the claimant succeeding in the derivative claim and the probable 
compensation that may be awarded following a successful claim.106  
The possibility that the defendant may ‘buy off’ the derivative claimant and that 
the claimant may agree to discontinue or settle the claim against the defendant on terms 
disadvantageous to the company, but which may be advantageous to themselves, is 
especially problematic given that the claimant is legally only acting in a representative 
capacity, on behalf of the company. Further, the company and all the other shareholders 
would be bound by both the decision of the claimant to discontinue or settle the claim, 
and the terms of such discontinuance or settlement, even though they may only be 
indirectly represented in the derivative claim.107 In this regard, it has been suggested 
that the risk of such ‘strategic’ behaviour on the part of derivative claimants is an 
especially real one in relation to claimants that only have a small level of shareholding 
in the company since they arguably have less incentive to consider the impact of any 
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discontinuance or settlement on the company and the other shareholders, or to prioritise 
the interests of the company and the other shareholders over their own.108 
b) Possible Solutions Under the Current Legal Framework 
Two possible, but imperfect, solutions to the aforementioned problems can be found in 
rule 19.9F of the CPR and section 261(4)(a) of the CA 2006, both of which give courts 
the discretion to make an order that court permission is to be obtained before a claim is 
discontinued or settled.109 The basis for the courts to do so is clearly set out in rule 
19.9F, which provides that ‘where the court has given permission to continue a 
derivative claim, the court may order that the claim may not be discontinued, settled or 
compromised without the permission of the court’. The basis for the courts to make 
such an order under section 261(4)(a) is stated less explicitly, although it does provide 
that a court, on hearing an application for permission to continue a derivative claim, 
may ‘give permission… to continue the claim on such terms as it thinks fit’, which 
could conceivably include the requirement that court permission be obtained before the 
claim is discontinued or settled.  
Nevertheless, rule 19.9F of the CPR and section 261(4)(a) of the CA 2006 do 
not provide a perfect or efficient solution to the problem since whether or not an order 
will be made that court permission is required before a claim is discontinued or settled 
is left entirely to the discretion of the courts.110 In order to address the  risk of collusion 
and the claimant agreeing to discontinue or settle the claim on terms disadvantageous 
to the company, the courts will have to proactively impose an order that court 
permission be obtained before a claim is discontinued or settled.111 This is especially 
since the parties to the claim who are contemplating a collusive arrangement are 
unlikely to request that such a condition be imposed.112 Unfortunately, it does not 
appear that the courts have imposed such a condition in any of the cases in which 
permission had been given to continue a derivative claim.113 Accordingly, the risk, 
under the current legal framework, of collusion and that a derivative claimant may agree 
to discontinue or settle the claim against the defendant(s) on terms disadvantageous to 
the company is a real one. 
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c) Reform Proposal  
For the foregoing reasons, this article argues that rule 19.9F of the CPR should be 
amended to expressly provide for the requirement for a claimant to obtain the 
permission of the court to discontinue or settle a derivative claim. This would ensure 
that the courts have the opportunity to scrutinise the full terms of any settlement 
(including details of any benefits to be provided to the claimant) and evaluate its 
fairness.114 This will significantly reduce the risk of collusion and the likelihood of a 
derivative claimant agreeing to discontinue or settle the claim against the defendant(s) 
on terms disadvantageous to the company. Further, the implementation of this proposal 
will also place the UK in consistency with many other jurisdictions in which court 
permission is required to discontinue or settle a derivative claim such as in Australia,115 
the United States,116 Singapore,117 Hong Kong,118 Canada,119 and New Zealand.120 
 
E. COSTS 
Having examined two key problematic provisions that are currently contained in Part 
11 of the CA 2006 on derivative claims and two important issues which appear to be 
missing from Part 11, this article will now explore the issue of costs as a barrier to 
commencing derivative claims. The issue of costs is an important consideration in any 
analysis of a derivative claim regime since even the most comprehensive statutory 
derivative regime will be ineffective if it cannot be accessed due to the high cost of 
pursuing a claim and the lack of funding.121 
In this section, this article will first show that the issue of costs currently plays 
a significant role in dissuading potential claimants from commencing a derivative 
claim. Thereafter, this article will examine the current legal framework in relation to 
the issue of costs and, in doing so, show that it does not satisfactorily address the 
aforementioned problem, with Part 11 of the CA 2006 notably not containing any 
express provisions on costs. Instead, the issue of costs is only partially addressed 
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through rule 19.9E of the CPR which, as will be shown later, is problematic. 
Accordingly, two suggestions for reform will be made.  
1. Costs as a Disincentive to Commencing Derivative Claims 
The issue of costs presents a significant disincentive on the part of any shareholder 
contemplating a derivative claim for three reasons. 
First, given that a losing litigant will normally be ordered to pay the costs of the 
successful party,122 there is a risk that a derivative claimant will have to pay both their 
own expenses in pursuing the claim as well as the legal costs of the defendant if the 
claim is unsuccessful. This risk of being saddled with significant legal costs is thus 
likely to deter a potential claimant unless they are highly confident of succeeding in the 
claim.123 
Second, derivative claims do not provide a shareholder with any direct remedy 
that would make pursuing a claim worthwhile from a financial perspective.124 This is 
because any damages recovered pursuant to a successful claim will go to the company, 
even though it is the claimant shareholder that bears the risks of having to incur heavy 
legal costs, especially if they lose.  
While it is possible that a shareholder who commences a derivative claim may 
obtain an indirect financial benefit if the price of the shares of the company increases 
following a successful claim (which may be the case, for example, where the company 
receives substantial damages or financial compensation from the defendant as a result 
of the claim),125 a share price appreciation following a derivative claim is not 
guaranteed and is subject to several factors.126 For one, a shareholder may not always 
succeed in a derivative claim and it would not, in any case, be easy for a shareholder to 
assess the likelihood of success especially at the preliminary stage of deciding whether 
to commence a claim. Further, it is also possible that a derivative claim may have the 
converse effect of a reduction in share price.127 This is especially  since the claim could 
negatively impact on the company’s reputation and cause a loss of confidence in the 
company directors.128 In addition, studies have shown that even when there is an 
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increase in share price following a successful derivative claim, the extent of such 
increase, and consequently its overall effect on shareholder wealth, is generally 
insignificant.129 Accordingly, the cost of pursuing a derivative claim is very likely to 
outweigh the indirect financial benefit which a shareholder may obtain as a result of the 
claim, if any.  
Lastly, even assuming that a claimant can obtain an indirect financial benefit 
through a share price appreciation following a successful derivative claim, the fact that 
all shareholders will obtain such benefit, notwithstanding that it is the claimant 
shareholder that bears the costs and risks of pursuing the claim, gives rise to a free-rider 
problem.130 Specifically, a potential claimant, being aware that the other shareholders 
will free-ride on these efforts, has a strong incentive to leave it to another shareholder 
to commence a derivative claim.131 If, however, all shareholders share this perspective, 
then it may be the case that no shareholder will step forward to commence a claim even 
when such a claim is clearly in the benefit of the company.132 
2. Problems with the Present Legal Framework on Costs 
As mentioned earlier, Part 11 of the CA 2006 does not contain any provision which 
expressly address the aforementioned problems in relation to the issue of costs. Instead, 
rule 19.9E of the CPR provides a partial solution to these problems by providing courts 
with the discretion to order the company ‘to indemnify the claimant against liability for 
costs incurred in the permission application or in the derivative claim or both’. This 
appears to reflect the decision in Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) in which it was observed 
that ‘it is open to the court in a stockholder's derivative action to order that the company 
indemnify the plaintiff against the costs incurred in the action’.133 Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, a closer examination will reveal that rule 19.9E of the CPR is problematic 
and does little to address the concerns identified earlier with respect to the issue of costs.  
First, it is unclear when, and under what circumstances, an indemnity order will 
be made under rule 19.9E in favour of an applicant since both the CA 2006 and the 
CPR are silent on this issue.134 Further, the case law is not entirely clear or consistent 
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on when a court will exercise its discretion to grant an indemnity order. In this regard, 
while the cases of Stainer v Lee135 and Iesini136 suggest that an indemnity order should 
‘normally’ be made once the applicant has obtained the permission of the court to 
proceed with the derivative claim, both cases do not clearly explain the exceptions to 
this general rule. Further, the approach suggested in both Stainer and Iesini does not 
appear to be consistent with the fact that an indemnity order had been granted only in 
approximately a quarter of the cases in which court permission to continue the 
derivative claim was obtained, which includes cases decided after Stainer and Iesini.137 
Accordingly, the absence of prospective certainty as to whether a court will grant a  cost 
indemnity order will likely dissuade shareholders from commencing a derivative claim.  
Second, the cases show that even when a cost indemnity order is granted, it is 
likely to be limited in scope and will not cover the full cost of pursuing the claim.138 
This was the case, for example, in Stainer, where the indemnity order was limited to 
£40,000, with the claimant having to obtain the permission of the court if they wished 
to extend the scope of the indemnity.139 Similarly, in Kiani v Cooper, the court only 
granted a heavily circumscribed cost indemnity order since it was of the view that the 
claimant should be required to assume part of the risk of litigation.140 Again, this is 
likely to weigh heavily on the mind of a shareholder who is contemplating whether to 
commence a derivative claim.  
Lastly, another important limitation with respect to cost indemnity orders is that 
such an order does not, by itself, provide a positive incentive to commence a derivative 
claim.141 Instead, such orders provide a basis for restoring a derivative claimant’s 
financial position to what it would have been had they not decided to pursue the 
derivative claim.142 In this regard, the Law Commission’s view that the possibility of a 
cost indemnity order provides a ‘significant incentive’ to commence a derivative 
claim143 is mistaken since such an order does not confer any additional financial benefit 
on a derivative claimant or result in them being financially better off than they would 
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have been had they not commenced the claim. Conversely, a derivative claimant faces 
a very real risk of incurring a substantial financial loss for the reasons mentioned earlier. 
It is thus clear from the foregoing discussion that there is a significant risk that 
the issue of costs may discourage appropriate derivative claims from being commenced. 
Further, even where a claim has already been commenced, if a court does not grant a 
cost indemnity order to a claimant who has obtained court permission to continue their 
claim, or provides one which is limited or heavily circumscribed, there is a risk that the 
claimant may then choose not to pursue the claim.144 In both instances, this would 
undermine the ability of derivative litigation to function as a key tool of corporate 
governance, in the ways set out at the start of this article. To address this problem, this 
article suggests that two changes should be made to the current legal framework. 
3.  Reform Proposal 1: Mandatory Indemnity Order 
Firstly, this article proposes that rule 19.9E of the CPR should be amended to provide 
for the right of a derivative claimant to obtain an indemnity order once court permission 
to continue the claim has been obtained, regardless of the eventual outcome.145 The 
indemnity order should cover the full costs incurred by the claimant in pursuing the 
derivative claim, provided that they are reasonable and proportionate. In contrast to the 
present position in which the decision as to whether to grant an indemnity order is left 
entirely to the discretion of the courts without any prescriptive guidance as to how such 
discretion should be exercised, the use of a mandatory indemnity order will provide 
shareholders with more certainty that they will not suffer a significant financial loss in 
pursuing a meritorious derivative claim.  
At the same time, by limiting the scope of the indemnity order to costs that are 
reasonably incurred and proportionate, this ensures that companies are not saddled with 
significant legal costs as a result of the claimant incurring excessive expenses in 
pursuing the claim. This is consistent with the general position under rule 44.3(1) of the 
CPR in which the courts, will not ‘allow costs which have been unreasonably incurred 
or are unreasonable in amount’ when making a cost order. In this regard, rule 44.3(5) 
of the CPR provides additional clarity on the factors that should be taken into account 
in assessing whether the costs incurred are proportionate. 
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It is difficult to see why a company should not be required to pay for the 
reasonable costs incurred by a claimant in pursuing a derivative claim once they have 
obtained the permission of the court to continue it. After all, before a court grants 
permission to continue a derivative claim, it must consider the extensive list of factors 
set out in section 263 and be satisfied, among other things, that a director acting in 
accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company would continue the 
claim.146 If so, it is questionable why the company should not be required to pay for the 
cost of the claim.147 This is especially since a derivative claimant is acting on behalf of 
the company, with any recovery obtained pursuant to the claim accruing to the 
company.148 Further, it has been persuasively argued that where a company obtains 
relief following a successful derivative claim but is not required to pay the costs 
incurred by the claimant in pursuing the claim, this amounts to unjust enrichment on 
the part of the company at the expense of the claimant since the company has essentially 
obtained the benefit of the claimant’s efforts.149  
4.  Reform Proposal 2: Rewarding Derivative Claimants  
It is clear from the previous discussion that the introduction of a mandatory indemnity 
order, for claimants who have obtained court permission to pursue their derivative 
claim, will help provide shareholders with more certainty that they will not suffer a 
significant financial loss in pursuing a meritorious derivative claim. Nevertheless, the 
analysis should not stop there since it has also been shown earlier that a cost indemnity 
order does not, by itself, produce a positive inducement to commence a derivative 
claim. Therefore, this article proposes that either the CA 2006 or the CPR should be 
amended to provide courts with the discretion to reward derivative claimants in 
monetary terms following a successful claim.150 
With respect to the quantum of the reward, this can be limited to a reasonable 
percentage of the proceeds of a successful action or, in cases where the relief obtained 
by the company is non-monetary, a reasonable amount that is reflective of the benefit 
obtained by the company as a result of the successful claim.151 With respect to the 
former, the court would direct the losing defendant to pay the allocated sum to the 
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claimant directly, while the latter would involve the court directing that a specified 
amount be paid to the claimant by the company. Both options produce a fair outcome 
since the amount of the claimant’s monetary reward is directly derived from, and is 
proportionate to, the benefit that is obtained by the company.152  
Further, the concept of providing a personal financial reward to a derivative 
claimant is not new and has been adopted in several jurisdictions,153 such as Israel154 
and New Zealand.155 Accordingly, there is a sizeable amount of foreign case law that 
can provide useful guidance in relation to any difficulties that may arise as to how the 
courts should exercise their discretion to reward derivative claimants. For example, in 
cases where the relief obtained by the company is non-pecuniary, reference may be 
made to Israeli case law in relation to the issue of how to calculate the quantum of 
reward in such a case since section 201 of the Israeli Companies Law 5759-1999 is 
broadly similar to the aforementioned proposal, providing that ‘[w]here the court rules 
in favor of the company, it may order the payment of a reward to the plaintiff taking 
into account, inter alia, the benefit derived by the company from filing the claim and 
winning it’. This may include, for instance, consideration of the severity and extent of 
the harm suffered by the company caused by the wrongdoers.156 
a) Rationale  
There are several reasons why the courts should be provided with a discretion to reward 
derivative claimants in monetary terms following a successful claim.  
First, the same justifications for the implementation of a mandatory indemnity 
order mentioned earlier, including the fact that the derivative claimant has essentially 
worked for the benefit of the company,157 similarly apply in this case. The difference 
here, however, is that even with the benefit of a cost indemnity order, the absence of a 
personal financial reward would mean that a derivative claimant would be in no better 
position than the other shareholders who had not made any effort to support the 
claim.158 
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, the possibility of a financial reward 
provides shareholders with an incentive to commence a meritorious derivative claim. 
In this regard, it has been persuasively argued that the use of a financial inducement is 
consistent with the nature of derivative claims since it is both expected and hoped that 
a shareholder will initiate a claim.159 After all, without the willingness of a shareholder 
to commence a claim, the effect may be that the wrong against the company goes 
unaddressed, with the company consequently not obtaining any remedy.160 In addition, 
the possibility of a financial reward provides an efficient solution to the shareholder 
free-rider problem identified earlier since there would be a positive incentive for 
shareholders to commence a claim.   
It is thus clear from the foregoing discussion that the implementation of both 
the proposals, for a mandatory indemnity order and for the courts to be given the 
discretion to provide successful derivative claimants with a financial reward, will play 
a significant role in addressing the serious problems associated with costs identified at 
the beginning of this section. In particular, these proposals will place derivative 
claimants on a more secure financial footing and make commencing a claim a 
sufficiently viable course of action. At the same time, and as explained earlier, there is 
sufficient protection against the commencement of vexatious and frivolous claims since 
such claims are clearly not in the interest of the company, and will accordingly be 
prevented by the courts from continuing through the factors to be considered at the 
second stage of the application process. This is particularly so in relation to section 
263(2)(a) and section 263(3)(b) since it is clear that a director acting in accordance with 
the duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue a derivative 
claim that is vexatious or oppressive.  
F. CONCLUSION  
The statutory derivative regime under Part 11 of the CA 2006, in many respects, 
represents a significant improvement from the common law regime on derivative 
claims. Nevertheless, the statutory framework on derivative claims is not without its 
share of problems. In this regard, this article has sought to identify some of the key 
problems with the statutory derivative regime, and to thereafter provide suggestions for 
reform. This was done through three broad areas of focus.  
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First, this article focused on the current provisions set out in Part 11, and 
identified two problematic requirements which are: the need under section 261(2) for a 
prima facie case to be established; and the requirement under section 263(3)(a) for the 
court to have regard to an applicant’s good faith in deciding whether to allow a 
derivative claim to continue. As shown earlier, both these requirements are 
unnecessary, and are likely to result, among other things, in uncertainty as well as 
additional time and costs being incurred in the application process. On this basis, both 
requirements should be removed. 
Next, this article shifted its focus to key omissions from both Part 11 of the CA 
2006 and the relevant procedural rules relating to derivative claims. In doing so, it was 
shown that the failure to expressly provide for both multiple derivative claims and a 
requirement for court permission to discontinue or settle a claim is regrettable. With 
regard to the former, this has resulted in the need for multiple derivative claims to be 
pursued under the problematic common law regime which, in turn, creates a significant 
risk that wrongs suffered by subsidiary companies may go unredressed, with the 
wrongdoers escaping liability through the use of additional corporate layers. As for the 
absence of a requirement for court permission to discontinue or settle a claim, this 
creates the risk of collusion between defendants and claimants, which could result in 
the former escaping liability and a settlement or discontinuance on terms 
disadvantageous to the company. For the foregoing reasons, both of these issues should 
be expressly provided for. 
Lastly, this article explored the issue of costs in the context of derivative claims 
and, in doing so, showed that costs currently play a significant role in dissuading 
potential claimants from commencing a derivative claim. To address this problem, this 
article proposed the introduction of a mandatory indemnity order and for courts to be 
provided with the discretion to reward derivative claimants in monetary terms following 
a successful claim.  
The problems identified in this article with respect to the current framework 
under the CA 2006 on derivative claims are serious and may adversely affect the 
effective functioning of the derivative regime. Accordingly, there is a strong impetus 
for these problems to be addressed, which can be done through the implementation of 
the proposals discussed earlier. Doing so will, in turn, help ensure that derivative claims 
can fulfil their potential as a key tool of corporate governance, in the ways set out at the 
start of this article. 
